Existing literature focuses on how corporate taxation affects firms' investment decisions by altering after-tax returns. This paper instead examines how corporate taxation affects investment by reducing the cash flow a firm has available to invest in the current period. I use a sharp nonlinearity in the mapping from pre-tax profitability to taxes created by the tax loss carryforward feature of the tax code to identify the cash flow effect of taxes. The results indicate that firms reduce investment when they pay more taxes, especially when unfavorable capital market conditions create a greater dependence of investment on internal sources of cash. 
Introduction
How the taxation of corporate profits affects firm investment decisions is a question of great importance to economists, policy-makers and investors. It is well-understood that corporate taxation can distort investment plans by reducing the after-tax returns to new investment. A large literature, starting with Jorgensen (1963) and Hall and Jorgensen (1967) , has attempted to assess the empirical relevance of such distortions. However, there is another channel through which corporate taxes can affect investment that is largely unexplored. If financing frictions make raising external capital costly, a firm's investment may be constrained by the amount of cash flow it is able to generate internally. 1 Corporate taxes then could also impact investment by reducing the amount of cash flow a firm has available to invest. This paper examines the effect of a firm's cash outflows to corporate income taxes in a given year on its investment in the same year. Studying this effect is challenging because of two omitted variables problems. First, a firm's income tax is a function of its profitability, which is likely to be correlated with its investment opportunity set. Second, current period income tax is likely to be related to a firm's future marginal tax rate, which could also affect investment. So, while one could in principle simply examine the contemporaneous relationship between a firm's tax payments and its investments, it would be difficult to infer causality from this relationship.
I confront the endogeneity problem by exploiting the loss carryforward feature of the U.S. federal tax code. To understand my approach to identification, consider a flat tax rate of 40% and two firms that are identical except that one has losses carried forward from prior periods of $1 while the other has no loss carryforwards. If the firms have identical pre-tax profits exceeding $1, then the firm with the loss carryforward will have $0.40 more after-tax cash flow than the one without. If the firms have identical pre-tax profits of less than $1, then the firm with the loss carryforward will not be able to fully use its carryforward in the period and will have additional cash flow after taxes equal to 40% of pre-tax profits.
Observe that the cash savings from using loss carryforwards increases with pre-tax profits up to the point at which carryforwards are fully used but not at all beyond this point. This makes this savings a sharply nonlinear function of pre-tax profitability and carryforwards available. A regression of investment on the tax savings from using carryforwards, controlling for pre-tax profitability and carryforwards available, then isolates the cash flow effect of these tax savings on investment under a simple and plausible assumption: that investment does not exhibit a similar sharply nonlinear relationship with these variables for other reasons, for example through changing investment opportunities or changing marginal tax rates.
I apply this approach to a large panel of firms covering the period 1970 through 2009. I find that an additional $1 of corporate taxes reduces capital expenditures in the same period by between $0.23 and $0.32, on average. However, the strength of this relationship varies considerably over time, as I am able to document given the length of my sample period. The effect is considerably stronger in years in which capital market conditions are less favorable, as reflected in a large spread between yields on low-grade and high-grade corporate bonds. This is consistent with a reduction in cash flow due to corporate taxes having a bigger effect on fixed asset investment in periods in which firms are forced to rely more on internal sources of cash to finance investment. Indeed, when capital market conditions are most favorable -in years in which the spread between yields on low-grade and high-grade bonds is in the bottom quartile during the sample period -a reduction in cash flow due to corporate taxes appears to have no effect on fixed asset investment.
One natural concern is that my regression specification is not flexible enough to account for possible nonlinearities in the relationship between investment and the variables that determine the amount of tax savings a firm realizes from using loss carryforwards. This is important because these variables could be related to investment opportunities or future marginal tax rate. I address this concern in two ways. First, I adopt a more flexible regression specification by including quadratic terms in the set of explanatory variables.
Second, I include an estimate of a firm's marginal tax rate directly as a control variable in my regressions. The results are robust to these alternative specifications.
While my main tests focus on capital expenditures as a form of investment, I also study the cash flow effect of corporate taxes on four other forms of investment: acquisitions, research and development, investment in net working capital, and advertising. While taxes have a negative impact on all four of these forms of investment in the full sample period, the effect is only statistically significant for acquisitions. However, in all four cases, the effect is stronger in years in which the spread between yields on low-grade and high-grade bonds is above its median for the sample period. Indeed, the effect is statistically significant for three of the four -acquisitions, research and development and investment in net working capital -in years in which the spread is high. Thus it appears that the cash flow effect of taxes impacts investment of various forms when external capital is more costly to obtain.
Since I am getting my identification from the set of firms that has tax loss carryforwards available to reduce taxes, I am cautious about interpreting my results too broadly.
For example, a firm that is consistently profitable, and therefore never generates loss carryforwards, might have a large cash balance or substantial debt capacity. A firm possessing such "financial slack" is unlikely to need to alter its investment plans if taxes reduce its cash flow below the point where it is sufficient to cover the firm's desired investment level. Nevertheless, even if my estimates apply exclusively to firms that have prior tax losses, which seems unlikely, the aggregate effect of current period taxes on current period investment in these firms alone is substantial. This paper contributes to the literature on corporate taxation and investment. The lit-erature examining the effects of marginal tax rates on investment is large, and includes papers by Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967) , Summers (1981) The general consensus is that higher marginal tax rates attenuate investment. Fazarri, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a) and Devereux and Griffith (2003) argue that average tax rates can also affect investment by reducing current period cash flow available to fund it.
To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first to directly test the importance of this cash flow channel. My evidence suggests that the cash flow consequences of taxation for investment are important.
More directly related to my paper, Auerbach and Poterba (1987) consider how tax loss carryforwards specifically affect investment by altering future marginal tax rates. They argue that the effect can go either way. On the one hand, the availability of carryforwards reduces a firm's marginal tax rate, thereby increasing after-tax returns to investing. This should make investment more attractive. On the other hand, the depreciation tax shield from additional fixed assets may be reduced when a firm has loss carryforwards, since these are substitute forms of tax shields. This should make investment less attractive. However, they do not consider the effect of the current period savings from using loss carryforwards on investment.
My paper also contributes to the literature on investment when firms face financing constraints. Fazarri, Hubbard and Petersen (1988b), and many papers that followed it, find that a firm's investment tends to be more sensitive to its cash flow when it is more likely to be financially constrained based on a priori measures. Their approach has been criticized for failing to adequately control for the quality of a firm's investment opportunities, creating an omitted variables problem that could produce spurious results (Poterba, 1988, Erickson and Whited, 2000, Alti, 2003) . Moreover, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue on theoretical grounds that the assumption underlying Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen's (1988b) hypothesis -that investment-cash flow sensitivity should be greater for more constrained firms -need not be correct. 3 Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994), Lamont (1997) , Rauh (2008) take a different approach, showing that plausibly exogenous shocks to a firm's cash flow affect its investment in general. 4 While most papers on this topic have found that investment does depend on cash flow, at least for firms that are most credit constrained, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , Cleary (1999) , Erickson and Whited (2000) and Pulvino and Tarhan (2010) present contrary evidence. 5 My paper concludes that investment is affected by cash flow -at least for cash flow related to corporate taxation. My biggest contribution to the financing constraints literature, made possible by the length of my sample period, is to show that the dependence of investment on cash flow varies substantially with capital market conditions. Specifically, when capital market conditions are unfavorable, investment is much more dependent on cash flow. This complements evidence in papers by Sufi (2007) , Lemmon and Roberts (2010) and Chava and Purnanandam (2011) showing that shocks to capital market conditions affect investment levels. 6 Using measures of capital market conditions similar to mine, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that firms are more likely to report that they face financing constraints when capital market conditions are less favorable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information, develops some terminology, and describes the methodology used in the paper. In section 3, I provide detail about the variables used in the empirical tests to follow and describe the sample. Section 4 presents the paper's results. Section 5 concludes.
Methodology
The objective of this paper is to examine the cash flow effect of corporate income taxes on investment. In principle, one could attempt to estimate this effect by simply regressing measures of investment on measures of taxes paid. However, taxes paid are a function of profitability, which is likely to be highly correlated with investment opportunities. They also relate to future marginal tax rates, which could affect investment decisions as well. Now, observe that a firm's total after-tax cash flow (A f terTaxCashFlow) in any period is equal to its pre-tax cash flow (PreTaxCashFlow) less income tax (IncomeTax). It is well-understood that a firm's operational cash flow may proxy for its investment opportunities. One possible solution to the omitted variable problem would be to regress investment measures on IncomeTax, controlling for PreTaxCashFlow. However, IncomeTax could capture information about investment opportunities or future marginal tax rates that is incremental to the information contained in PreTaxCashFlow. So it would be difficult to infer causality from the results of such a regression.
Carryforwards affect a profitable firm's cash flow by reducing its income taxes. Define
TaxOnPreNOLIncome as the amount of income tax that a firm would have paid in the current period if it had had no net operating losses carried forward from prior periods with which to offset current period income. Further, define TaxSavings as the amount by which the firm's current period tax bill is reduced by the application of any net operating losses carried forward from prior periods. Then income tax can be written as
To further illustrate these concepts, suppose that the tax rate is a flat 40% and that a firm earns a profit of $100 before taxes in the current period but has carried forward past losses of $40. Then TaxOnPreNOLIncome, the tax due ignoring the carryforward offset, is 40% of $100, or $40. However, income tax is computed on income after the application of the carryforward offset, which is $100 -$40 = $60. So IncomeTax is 40% of $60, or $24.
The $16 difference between the amount of taxes that would have been due absent the carryforward, $40, and actual income tax, $24, is TaxSavings, the savings that the firm realizes because it has tax losses carried forward from prior periods.
Since IncomeTax is TaxOnPreNOLIncome less TaxSavings, A f terTaxCashFlow can be written as 
where α i and γ t represent firm and year effects respectively. The coefficient β 1 captures the effect on investment of a reduction in taxes due to the use of tax loss carryforwards.
An equivalent interpretation is that −β 1 captures the effect of additional current period taxes on investment.
The methodology employed in this paper is related to the approach of Rauh (2006) , who also investigates the effect of a cash flow variable that is a nonlinear deterministic function of other variables. It is also related to the approach used by Classen (1977) in investigating the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration. Classen is able to disentangle the independent effect of unemployment benefits by taking advantage of the fact that unemployment benefits are typically capped, so that they do not increase with pre-job loss income beyond a specified point. If unemployment duration is related to the level of unemployment benefits, independently of any relationship through prejob loss income, then the relationship between unemployment duration and pre-job loss income will exhibit a kink at the point of the cap. The sharpness of the kink measures the independent effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration.
Data and sample construction
The firm data used in this paper come primarily from the COMPUSTAT database of 
Variable construction
All of the variables described below are scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (COM-PUSTAT at). 7 As described in the previous section, investment is the dependent variable in the primary regression equation. Investment can take many forms. Consistent with the existing literature, I focus primarily on capital expenditures (capx). However, I also examine the effect of TaxSavings on other forms of investment, including acquisitions (aqc), research and development (xrd), advertising (xad), and net working capital investment, which is change in accounts receivable (rect), plus change in investment (invt), minus change in accounts payable (ap).
A f terTaxCashFlow is the sum of net income before extraordinary items (ib) and depreciation (dp). Since tax books are unavailable, I follow the literature and define IncomeTax as current federal income tax expense (txc)). 8 I back into PreTaxCashFlow by summing 7 Results do not vary qualitatively if variables are scaled by total plant, property and equipment instead. 8 Dworin (1985) investigates the reasonableness of current tax expense as a proxy for income tax liability using confidential tax return data for 1979-1981. He shows in general that current tax expense reported by COMPUSTAT is 5% to 8% larger on average than income tax liability. The disparity is very large for A f terTaxCashFlow and IncomeTax. Carry f orwardsAvailable are COMPUSTAT tlc f , lagged one year. 9 TaxOnPreNOLIncome is calculated in three steps. I first back out federal taxable income from IncomeTax using the full federal corporate income tax rate schedule. I then add to this any reductions in carryforwards from the end of the prior year to the end of the current year. And finally, I compute the income tax that the firm would have paid had it had this amount of income, again using the full federal corporate income tax rate schedule. TaxSavings is the difference between TaxOnPreNOLIncome and IncomeTax, and is always non-negative.
My approach to calculating TaxOnPreNOLIncome assumes that any reduction in tax loss carryforwards in a given year represents the use of carryforwards to reduce taxable income. This ignores the possibility that NOL carryforwards may decrease simply because some of these carryforwards expire, which could result in measurement error in regulated utilities, which are not included in my sample. The disparity also appears to be a bigger issue for smaller firms. In untabulated robustness tests, I purge my sample of firms with total assets below various thresholds (e.g., $100 million, $500 million, $1 billion) and find that the paper's results continue to hold. 9 NOL carryforwards as reported in COMPUSTAT are noisy estimates of U.S. federal tax-book carryforwards for three reasons: 1) COMPUSTAT often captures financial-book rather than the tax-book carryforwards, 2) COMPUSTAT makes coding errors in capturing this variable, and 3) the amount of loss carryforwards reported in COMPUSTAT can include federal, state, and foreign carryforwards. Using confidential firm-level U.S. federal tax return data, Mills, Newberry and Novack (2003) find that COMPUSTAT reports a carryforward balance when no carryforward exists per the tax return 9.4% of the time, and that COMPUSTAT reports no carryforward balance when a carryforward does exist per the tax return 3.3% of the time. Kinney and Swanson (1993) report that, in a sample of 266 firm-years, there are 28 cases in which tax loss carryforwards are missing in COMPUSTAT but a carryforward for tax purposes is reported in the tax footnote, and 5 cases in which tax loss carryforwards are populated in COMPUSTAT but there is no carryforward at all reported in the tax footnote. Manzon (1994) reports similar error rates. Mills, Newberry and Novack (2003) recommend considering firms to have carryforwards only if COMPUSTAT reports a positive carryforward balance and no U.S. current income tax. This reduces the frequency of cases in which an NOL carryforward is reported but no tax NOL exists from 9.4% to 1.5%. This restriction is imposed for inclusion in my sample. For robustness, I also remove all firms reporting identifiable assets in foreign segments and re-obtain the paper's main results.
Finally, Tobin sQ is calculated as the quotient of the market and book values of a firm's assets. Market value (the numerator) is book assets (at) plus the market value of equity (prcc f * csho) minus the book value of equity (ceq) minus deferred taxes (txdb). Book value (the denominator) is simply book assets (at).
Sample construction
I begin with all observations in the COMPUSTAT database from 1970 through 2009, excluding firms in the financial industry (SIC code between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC code between 4900 and 4999). This initial sample contains 278,677 observations. I then eliminate all observations for which any of the variables described above is missing, which leaves 91,041 observations. I next apply several screens to ensure the internal consistency of the data and its appropriateness for my study. Specifically, I eliminate the following observations: Unless there are restrictions on using carryforwards to offset income for federal income tax purposes, a firm should not pay taxes until all of its carryforwards are consumed. Restrictions might exist either if reported carryforwards apply to nonfederal taxes or if carryforwards were obtained in an acquisition and are subject to a section 382 limitation. 10 Eliminating these observations should reduce measurement error in my variables.
Observations for which
IncomeTax is zero and carryforwards increase from the beginning to the end of year are eliminated. These likely represent cases in which a firm has suffered a tax loss and is accruing new carryforwards. Again, it is difficult to determine what values to assign to IncomeTax, TaxOnPreNOLIncome, and TaxSavings in this case. 4 . Observations for which both IncomeTax and end-of-year carryforwards are zero. In principle, it is possible that a firm's profits are just the right amount to exactly offset all of the firm's profits but not to lead to the accumulation of new carryforwards.
However, these knife's edge cases should be rare, and these cases are more likely to result from encoding errors.
These screens conform directly to the recommendations of Mills, Newberry and Novack Their relative lack of profitability is not surprising since carryforward firms by definition have suffered losses -at least on a tax basis -in the recent past. Interestingly, though, Tobin's Q does not vary substantively between the two subsamples. This, combined with the fact that all firms in the sample are profitable on a tax basis in the current year by construction, suggests that carryforward firms in the sample cannot be readily categorized as "distressed" firms.
Results
This section presents the paper's results. The methodology developed in section 2 is Table 2 . The dependent variable in all of the regressions presented in Table 2 is capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets. One might reasonably be concerned that quantifying the effect of TaxSavings on capital expenditures is asking "too much" of the data, since my estimate of this amount is based on book rather than tax measures of tax loss carryforwards and hence is somewhat crude. To address this, I define PositiveCarry f orwards to be an indicator variable taking a value of one if the firm has tax loss carryforwards available and zero otherwise. For any given level of TaxOnPreNOLIncome, the firm should have more after-tax cash flow available to invest if it has loss carryforwards available than if it doesn't. I therefore substitute the interaction between between TaxOnPreNOLIncome and PositiveCarry f orwards Having established that this tax savings has a positive effect on investment in Table 2 , I next perform a series of robustness checks. The first involves adding MarginalTaxRate, which is the marginal tax rate from Graham (1996a,b) , as a control variable. The results are presented in Table 3 . Because marginal tax rate is only available starting in 1980, the sample that I use in this estimation is smaller than the one used in Table 2. I begin by simply re-estimating the specification in column 2 of Table 2 Table 2 , and the other coefficients are similar as well. I then add MarginalTaxRate as a control. The results, shown in column 2, indicate a positive association between marginal tax rate and investment. This could indicate that marginal tax rate proxies for investment opportunities or that firms with a higher marginal tax rate benefit more in the short-run from establishing new depreciation or interest tax shields.
The coefficient on TaxSavings remains almost unchanged and continues to be statistically significant at the 1% level.
Finally, in column 3, I add the indicator ZeroMTR, which takes a value of one if the firm has a marginal tax rate of zero and one otherwise. I include this variable because marginal tax rate is zero for a fairly large fraction of firms. The coefficient on this indicator is not statistically significant, and the other coefficients are virtually unchanged after this variable is included.
After showing that my results do not change after controlling for MarginalTaxRate, I
next present a series of robustness checks that address possible concerns about the construction of my sample. The results of these tests are shown in Table 4 . One potential concern is that firms have an incentive to manage their earnings in order to maximize the value of the net operating loss asset. For example, Maydew (1997) Another concern is the manner in which I calculate TaxSavings. The amount of income offset by carryforwards in a given year is calculated as the decrease in carryforwards from the beginning of the year to the end of the year. However, carryforwards can also fall because they expire unused. To address this concern, I eliminate from the sample any firm that has reported positive tax loss carryforwards for the N consecutive years leading up to the year of that observation, where N is the number of years a firm can carry forward a loss before it expires and is equal to five years before 1981, 15 years from 1981 through 1997, and 20 years after 1997. This is a conservative approach, since it results in eliminating observations where a firm might able to use carryforwards to offset profits.
Its effect on the sample size, however, is small, leaving 52,799 usable observations. The results after this filter is imposed are presented in column 3. The coefficient on TaxSavings is virtually unchanged at 0.327 and remains statistically significant at the 1% level.
Finally, note that I use tax loss carryforwards as reported by COMPUSTAT to construct several variables used in the study. In addition to concerns about whether these book carryforward measures reflect the availability of carryforwards on the tax books, which I cannot address, these carryforwards are reported in aggregate, without respect to whether they arise from past federal, state or foreign tax losses. This is potentially problematic, as I use federal current tax expense as my proxy for income taxes. To at least partially address this concern, I eliminate all firms that report a foreign segment in COMPUSTAT's SEGMENTS database. Applying this filter reduces the sample size to 25,917 observations. The results are presented in column 4. The coefficient on TaxSavings changes only slightly, to 0.299, and remains statistically significant at the 1% level.
In summary, firms invest more in fixed assets in a year when they pay less in taxes during that year, other things being equal. This result appears to be quite robust. If the result is being driven by a relaxation of a financing constraint, then it should be stronger when alternatives to internal financing are more limited, i.e., when capital market conditions are less favorable. I test this prediction next.
NOL tax savings, capital expenditures, and capital market conditions
I measure capital market conditions annually using the average spread for the year between yields on Baa-and Aaa-rated corporate bonds, as rated by Moody's (BaaAaaSpread).
While no measure of capital market conditions is perfect, this measure directly reflects the willingness of external financial markets to fund risky investment. It also has the advantage of being available during my entire 40 year sample period. I focus on a debt-based measure of capital market conditions, since debt is the primary source of external financing for fixed asset investment. The spread ranges from a low of 0.60% to a high of 2.33% during the sample period.
To investigate how the sensitivity of investment to the cash flow effects of corporate taxation varies with capital market conditions, I sort the observations in my sample into quartiles based on BaaAaaSpread in the year of the observation. I then estimate regression equation (2) for each of these subsamples separately. The results are shown in Table 5 .
As the table shows, the strength of the relationship between capital expenditures and TaxSavings increases monotonically from the lowest to highest BaaAaaSpread subsamples. Indeed, the relationship is statistically insignificant in the lowest spread quartile.
These results are consistent with the current period cash flow consequences of taxes having a greater effect when capital market conditions are less favorable.
The magnitudes of the coefficients on TaxOnPreNOLIncome and PreTaxCashFlow also increase monotonically from the lowest to highest spread quartile. This is consistent with investment depending more on internal cash flow in general when accessing external finance is more difficult, and is therefore consistent with variation over time in the observed effect of TaxSavings.
Next, in Table 6 One concern is that credit market conditions are likely to be correlated with the state of the economy, which is a potential determinant of overall investment opportunities. Therefore, in column 2, I also include interactions of annual change in real GDP with the explanatory variables as controls. These interactions do have explanatory power over capital expenditures. However, the interaction of TaxSavings and BaaAaaSpread continues to have a positive and statistically significant coefficient of similar magnitude to the one in column 1. Thus it does not appear that the effects I ascribe to time variation in capital market conditions is attributable to changing macroeconomic conditions.
NOL tax savings and other forms of investment
While empirical models of investment typically focus on capital expenditures, corporate investment activity can take many other forms. For example, a firm can use cash to acquire another firm, undertake research and development, invest in working capital, or invest in market share by advertising. I next estimate equation (2) This evidence supports only a weak effect of income tax-related cash flow on forms of investment other than capital expenditures, on average. However, as Tables 5 and 6 show, the sensitivity of capital expenditures to savings from tax loss carryforwards varies substantially with capital market conditions. I next show that this is true for other forms of investment as well. I divide the sample period into years when BaaAaaSpread is above median and years when it is below median. I then re-run each of the regressions from Table 7 separately for each of these two subsamples. The results are presented in Table 8 .
As the table shows, in the years in which BaaAaaSpread is above median, TaxSavings has a positive and statistically significant effect on three of the four measures of investment (acquisitions, research and development, and change in working capital). Moreover, the coefficient on TaxSavings is higher in years in which BaaAaaSpread is above median than when it is below median in all four cases. This suggests that capital market conditions are important in determining the response of many forms of investment (not just capital expenditures) to the cash flow effects of income taxes.
Conclusion
This paper has provided evidence that corporate taxation affects firms' investment levels by altering after-tax cash flows available to finance this investment internally. It has also shown that this effect is stronger when capital market conditions are less favorable, indicating that time series variation in the severity of financing constraints is important.
Overall, the results suggest that the "cash flow" channel is an important channel through which corporate taxation affects investment. 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 and depreciation (dp). IncomeTax is current federal income tax expense (txc)). PreTaxCashFlow is backed into by summing A f terTaxCashFlow and IncomeTax. Carry f orwardsAvailable are COMPUSTAT tlc f , lagged one year. TaxOnPreNOLIncome is calculated by backing out federal taxable income from IncomeTax using the full federal corporate income tax rate schedule, adding to this any reductions in carryforwards from the end of the prior year to the end of the current year, and computing the income tax that the firm would have paid had it had this amount of income. TaxSavings is the difference between TaxOnPreNOLIncome and IncomeTax. Tobin sQ is calculated as the quotient of the market and book values of a firm's assets. Market value (the numerator) is book assets (at) plus the market value of equity (prcc f * csho) minus the book value of equity (ceq) minus deferred taxes (txdb). Book value (the denominator) is simply book assets (at). Panel B compares the distributions for the subsample of firms that have loss carryforwards available at the beginning of the year ("Carryforward Firms") and the subsample of those that don't ("Non-Carryforward Firms"). 
